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Abstract
Game theory studies situations in which strategic players can modify the state of a given system, due to the
absence of a central authority. Solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are defined to predict the outcome of
such situations. In multi-player settings, it has been pointed out that to be realistic, a solution concept should be
obtainable via processes that are decentralized and reasonably simple. Accordingly we look at the computation
of solution concepts by means of decentralized dynamics. These are algorithms in which players move in turns
to improve their own utility and the hope is that the system reaches an “equilibrium” quickly.
We study these dynamics for the class of opinion games, recently introduced by Bindel et al. [9]. These are
games, important in economics and sociology, that model the formation of an opinion in a social network. We
study best-response dynamics and show upper and lower bounds on the convergence to Nash equilibria. We also
study a noisy version of best-response dynamics, called logit dynamics, and prove a host of results about its
convergence rate as the noise in the system varies. To get these results, we use a variety of techniques developed
to bound the mixing time of Markov chains, including coupling, spectral characterizations and bottleneck ratio.
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1 Introduction
Social networks are widespread in physical and digital worlds. The following scenario therefore becomes of
interest. Consider a group of individuals, connected in a social network, who are members of a committee, and
suppose that each individual has his own opinion on the matter at hand. How can this group of people reach
consensus? This is a central question in economic theory, especially for processes in which people repeatedly
average their own opinions. This line of work, see e.g. [1, 13, 20, 21], is based on a model defined by DeGroot
[12]. In this model, each person i holds an opinion equal to a real number xi, which might for example represent
a position on a political spectrum. There is an undirected weighted graph G = (V,E,w) representing a social
network, and node i is influenced by the opinions of his neighbors in G (the influence of neighbor j is stronger
the higher wij is). In each time step, node i updates his opinion to be a weighted average of his current opinion
with the current opinions of his neighbors. A variation of this model of interest to our study is due to Friedkin and
Johnsen [19]. In [19] it is additionally assumed that each node i maintains a persistent internal belief bi, which
remains constant even as node i updates his overall opinion xi through averaging. (See Section 2 for the formal
framework.)
However, as recently observed by Bindel et al. [9], consensus is hard to reach, the case of political opinions
being a prominent example. The authors of [9] justify the absence of consensus by interpreting repeated averaging
as a decentralized dynamics for selfish players. Consensus is not reached as players will not compromise further
when this diminishes their utility. Therefore, these dynamics will converge to an equilibrium in which players
might disagree; Bindel et al. study the cost of disagreement by bounding the price of anarchy in this setting.
In this paper, we continue the study of [9] and ask the question of how quickly equilibria are reached by
decentralized dynamics in opinion games. We focus on the setting in which players have only a finite number
of strategies available. This is motivated by the fact that in many cases although players have personal beliefs
which may assume a continuum of values, they only have a limited number of strategies available. For example,
in political elections, people have only a limited number of parties they can vote for and usually vote for the party
which is closer to their own opinions. Motivated by several electoral systems around the world, we concentrate in
this study on the case in which players only have two strategies available. This setting already encodes a number
of interesting technical challenges as outlined below.
1.1 Our contribution
For the finite version of the opinion games considered in [9], we firstly note that this is a potential game [26, 23]
thus implying that these games admit pure Nash equilibria. The set of pure Nash equilibria is then characterized
(cf. Lemma 2.4). We also notice the interesting fact that while the games in [9] have a price of anarchy of
9/8, our games have unbounded price of anarchy, thus implying that for finite games disagreeing has far more
deep consequences on the social cost. We additionally prove that the socially optimal profile is always a Nash
equilibrium when the weights of the social network are integers, thus implying that the Price of Stability is 1 in
this case, and in general a tight bound of 2 for the Price of Stability when edges have fractional weights.
We then study decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. We first consider the best-response dynamics,
by proving that it quickly converges to pure Nash equilibria in the case of unweighted social networks. For
general weights, we prove that the convergence rate is polynomial in the number of players but exponential in the
representation of the weights. We also prove that for a specific opinion game, there exists an exponentially-long
sequence of best responses thus implying that convergence may be exponential in general. The upper bounds are
proved by “reducing” an opinion game to a version of it in which the internal beliefs can only take certain values.
The reduced version is equivalent to the original one, as long as best-response dynamics is concerned. Note that
the convergence rate for the version of the game considered in [9] is unknown.
In real life, however, there is some noise in the decision process of players. Arguably, people are not fully
rational. On the other hand, even if they were, they might not exactly know what strategy represents the best re-
sponse to a given strategy profile due to the incapacity to correctly determine their utility functions. To model this,
we study logit dynamics [10] for opinion games. Logit dynamics features a rationality level β ≥ 0 (equivalently,
a noise level 1/β) and each player is assumed to play a strategy with a probability which is proportional to the
corresponding utility to the player and β. So the higher β is, the less noise there is and the more the dynamics
is similar to best-response dynamics. Logit dynamics for potential games defines a Markov chain that has a nice
structure. As in [5, 4] we exploit this structure to prove bounds on the convergence rate of logit dynamics to the
so-called logit equilibrium. The logit equilibrium corresponds to the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.
Intuitively, a logit equilibrium is a probability distribution over strategy profiles of the game; the distribution is
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concentrated around pure Nash equilibrium profiles1. It is observed in [5] how this notion enjoys a number of
desiderata one would like solution concepts to have.
We prove a host of results on the convergence rate of logit dynamics that give a pretty much complete picture
as β varies. We give an upper bound in terms of the cutwidth of the graph modeling the social network. The
bound is exponential in β and the cutwidth of the graph, thus yielding an exponential guarantee for some topology
of the social network. We complement this result by proving a polynomial upper bound when β takes a small
value. We complete the preceding upper bound in terms of the cutwidth with lower bounds. Firstly, we prove
that in order to get an (essentially) matching lower bound it is necessary to evaluate the size of a certain subset of
strategy profiles. When β is big enough relatively to this subset then we can prove that the upper bound is tight
for any social network (specifically, we roughly need β bigger than n logn over the cutwidth of the graph). For
smaller values of β, we are unable to prove a lower bound which holds for every graph. However, we prove that
the lower bound holds in this case at both ends of the spectrum of possible social networks. In details, we look at
two cases of graphs encoding social networks: cliques, which model monolithic, highly interconnected societies,
and complete bipartite graphs, which model more sparse “antitransitive” societies. For these graphs, we firstly
evaluate the cutwidth and then relate the latter to the size of the aforementioned set of states. This allows to prove
a lower bound exponential in β and the cutwidth of the graph for (almost) any value of β. As far as we know, no
previous result was known about the cutwidth of a complete bipartite graph; this might be of independent interest.
The result on cliques is instead obtained by generalizing arguments in [22].
To prove the convergence rate of logit dynamics to logit equilibrium we adopt a variety of techniques developed
to bound the mixing time of Markov chains. To prove the upper bounds we use some spectral properties of the
transition matrix of the Markov chain defined by the logit dynamics, and coupling of Markov chains. To prove the
lower bounds, we instead rely on the concept of bottleneck ratio and the relation between the latter and mixing
time. (The interested reader might refer to [22] for a discussion of these concepts. Below, we give a quick overview
of these techniques and state some useful facts.)
1.2 Related works
In addition to the papers mentioned above, our paper is related to the works on logit dynamics. This dynamics is
introduced by Blume [10] and it is mainly adopted in the analysis of graphical coordination games [15, 25, 24],
in which players are placed on vertices of a graph embedding social relations and each player wants to coordinate
with neighbors: we highlight that an unique game is played on every edge, whereas, for opinion games, we need
different games in order to encode beliefs. Asadpour and Saberi [2] adopt the logit dynamics for analyzing a class
of congestion games. However, none of these works evaluates the time the logit dynamics takes in order to reach
the stationary distribution: this line of research is conducted in [5, 4].
A number of papers study the efficient computation of (approximate) pure Nash equilibria for 2-strategy
games, such as party affiliation games [17, 6] and cut games [8]. The class of games we study here contrasts with
those in that for the games considered here, Nash equilibria can be found in polynomial time (Observation 2.3),
so that our interest is in the extent to which equilibria can be found easily with simple decentralized dynamic
processes. Similarly to these works, we focus on a class of 2-strategy games and study efficient computation of
pure Nash equilibria; additionally we also study the convergence rate to logit equilibria.
Another related work is [14] by Dyer and Mohanaraj. They study graphical games, called pairwise-interaction
games, and prove among other results, quick convergence of best-response dynamics for these games. However,
our games do not fall in their class. The difference is that, in their case, there is a unique game being played on the
edges of the graph; as noted above, we instead need a different game to encode the internal beliefs of the players.
2 The game
Let G = (V,E) be a connected undirected graph with |V | = n and for each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E let wij > 0 be
its weight. We set wij = 0 if (i, j) is not an edge of G. Every vertex of the graph represents a player. Each player
i has an internal belief bi ∈ [0, 1] and only two strategies or opinions are available, namely 0 and 1. Motivated by
1Thus, the solution concept of logit dynamics is different from the one associated with best-response dynamics.
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the model in [9], we define the utility of player i in a strategy profile x ∈ {0, 1}n as
ui(x) = −

(xi − bi)2 + ∑
(i,j)∈E
wij(xi − xj)2

 .
We call such a game an n-player opinion game on a graph G. Let Di(x) =
∑
j : xi 6=xj wij be the sum of the
weights of edges going from i to players with the opposite opinion to i. Then
ui(x) = −(xi − bi)2 −Di(x).
2.1 Potential function
Let D(x) =
∑
i,j : xi 6=xj wij be the sum of the weights of discording edges in the strategy profile x, that is the
weight of all edges in G whose endpoints have different opinions. Thus, D(x) = 12
∑
iDi(x).
Lemma 2.1. The function
Φ(x) =
∑
i
(xi − bi)2 +D(x) (1)
is an exact potential function for the opinion game described above.
Proof. Given a strategy profile x, player i experiences a non-positive utility or equivalently, a non-negative cost
defined as ci(x) = −ui(x). We show that in an opinion game if players minimize their cost, then the function Φ
defined in (1) decreases. The difference in the cost to player i when he switches from strategy xi to strategy yi is
ci(x) − ci(x−i, yi) = (xi − bi)2 − (yi − bi)2 +Di(x) −Di(x−i, yi).
The difference in the potential function between the two corresponding profiles is
Φ(x)− Φ(x−i, yi) =
∑
j
(xj − bj)2 +D(x) −
∑
j 6=i
(xj − bj)2 − (yi − bi)2 −D(x−i, yi)
= (xi − bi)2 − (yi − bi)2 +D(x) −D(x−i, yi).
Discording edges not incident on i are not affected by the deviation of player i. That is, if we let Ki(x) =∑
j,k 6=i; xj 6=xk wjk be the sum of the weights of these edges, then Ki(x) = Ki(x−i, yi). The claim then follows
since D(x) = Ki(x) +Di(x) and D(x−i, yi) = Ki(x−i, yi) +Di(x−i, yi).
A more convenient way to express the potential function above, useful in one of the proofs below, is the
following: Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E Φe(x), where, for an edge e = (i, j),
Φe(x) =


αe :=
b2i
∆i
+
b2j
∆j
, if xi = xj = 0;
βe :=
b2i
∆i
+
(1−bj)2
∆j
+ wij , if xi = 0 and xj = 1;
γe :=
(1−bi)2
∆i
+
b2j
∆j
+ wij , if xi = 1 and xj = 0;
δe :=
(1−bi)2
∆i
+
(1−bj)2
∆j
, if xi = xj = 1.
(2)
and ∆i represents the degree of i.
Notice that the potential function Φ looks similar to (but is not the same as) the social cost
SC(x) = −
n∑
i=1
ui(x) =
∑
i
(xi − bi)2 + 2D(x).
Observation 2.2 ([16]). The profile minimizing the social cost can be computed in polynomial time by a central-
ized algorithm.
Specifically, Escoffier et al. [16] showed that it corresponds to the (s, t)-cut of minimum weight in a suitably
built graph.
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2.2 Nash equilibria, Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability
We start with a simple observation about the centralized computation of Nash equilibria.
Observation 2.3. Nash equilibria of the opinion games studied here, can be found in polynomial time.
Specifically, consider the following simple greedy algorithm. Start with the pure profile x where everyone
plays 0. Check for players who prefer to play 1; notice that any such player must play 1 in any Nash equilibrium;
modify x so that they play 1. Repeat this until no player prefers to change his own strategy.
Notice that this algorithm finds an equilibrium that maximizes the number of players playing 0, and we could
similarly find one that maximizes the number of players playing 1. It does not necessarily find a socially optimal
equilibrium, although it follows from Theorem 2.7 below and Observation 2.2 that when edge weights are integers,
the lowest-cost equilibrium is computable in polynomial time.
We next give a characterization of Nash equilibria. Let Bi be the integer closer to the internal belief of the
player i: that is, Bi = 0 if bi ≤ 1/2, Bi = 1 if bi > 1/2. Moreover, let Wi =
∑
j wij be the total weight of edges
incident on i and W si (x) =
∑
j : xj=s
wij be the total weight of edges going from i to players playing strategy s
in the profile x.
The following lemma shows that, for every player, it is preferable to select the opinion closer to his own belief
if and only if more than (almost) half of his (weighted) neighborhood has selected this opinion.
Lemma 2.4. In a Nash equilibrium profile x, it holds that for each player i
xi =
{
Bi, if W
Bi
i (x) ≥ Wi2 − δ;
1−Bi, if WBii (x) ≤ Wi2 − δ;
where δ = 12 − |Bi − bi|.
Proof. Let us start by observing that |Bi − bi| = Bi + bi − 2biBi and then
(1−Bi − bi)2 = (Bi − bi)2 − 2|Bi − bi|+ 1. (3)
Now, we first prove that a profile for which the above conditions hold is a Nash equilibrium, and then we prove
that every other profile is not in equilibrium.
Let x be a profile for which the above conditions hold for every player and i be one such player. We consider
first the case that WBii (x) ≥Wi/2− δ: then we have xi = Bi. There is no incentive for i to play 1−Bi since
ui(x−i, 1−Bi) = −
[
(1−Bi − bi)2 +WBii (x)
]
≤ −
[
(Bi − bi)2 +
(
Wi
2
+ δ
)]
≤ −
[
(Bi − bi)2 +
(
Wi −WBii (x)
)]
= ui(x),
where we used (3) for the first inequality. Similarly, we can prove that if WBii (x) ≤ Wi2 − δ, and thus xi =
1 − Bi, then ui(x−i, Bi) ≤ ui(x). Hence, no player has incentive to switch his opinion in x ad thus x is a Nash
equilibrium.
Now consider a profile y for which the conditions above do not hold for some player i. It must be the case that
WBii (y) 6= Wi/2 − δ. If WBii (y) > Wi/2 − δ, this means that yi = 1 − Bi; similarly, if WBii (y) < Wi2 − δ,
we have that yi = Bi. However, it is immediate to check that in the former case ui(y) < ui(y−i, Bi) and in the
latter case ui(y) < ui(y−i, 1−Bi).
Roughly speaking, Lemma 2.4 identifies the point at which a player’s neighbors dictate his strategy and over-
come his internal belief.
Price of Anarchy and Stability.
Observation 2.5. The price of anarchy of the social network games studied here is unbounded.
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To see this, consider the opinion game on a clique where each player has internal belief 0 and each edge has
weight 1: the profile where each player has opinion 0 has social cost 0. By Lemma 2.4, the profile where each
player has opinion 1 is a Nash equilibrium and its social cost is n > 0. This is in sharp contrast with the bound
9/8 proved in [9].
We complete this section by proving bounds on the Price of Stability.
Theorem 2.6. For opinion games, the price of stability is 2.
Proof. We begin by proving the upper bound of 2 on the price of stability for any opinion game G. Let x⋆ be the
profile of G minimizing the potential function and OPT be the profile minimizing the social cost. Therefore, we
have
SC(x⋆) = Φ(x⋆) +D(x⋆) ≤ 2 · Φ(x⋆) ≤ 2 · Φ(OPT ) ≤ 2 · SC(OPT ).
Since x⋆ is a Nash equilibrium then the upper bound to the price of stability follows.
For the lower bound, consider an opinion game G defined on a star-shaped social network with n + 1 nodes,
with n > 4, where each edge is weighted 1/n. Let each external node, but one, have belief 1. The center and the
remaining external node have instead belief 0.
We now argue that the social cost is minimized by the profile in which all nodes apart from the center play their
own belief. Indeed, its cost is 1 + 2/n = (n+ 2)/n (we have one discording edge weighted 1/n and additionally
the center has a cost of 1 since he is playing the strategy opposite to his own belief). All profiles in which at least
two nodes play the strategy opposite to their belief have cost at least 2 > 1 + 2/n. All profiles in which there is
only one player, different from the center, playing opposite to his belief will have k > 1 discording edges and then
a cost of 1 + 2k/n > (n + 2)/n. Finally, the profile in which each player plays his belief has n − 1 discording
edges for a social cost of 2(n− 1)/n = (2n− 2)/n > (n+ 2)/n.
Now we note that the latter profile, that we will call x, is the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. Indeed, for
all nodes but the center, it is a dominant strategy to play their belief (by doing so, they will have a cost of at most
1/n while by switching their cost would be at least 1). But then by Lemma 2.4, the center has a strict incentive to
play his belief as well since, letting i be the center, W 0i (x) = 1/n > 0 =Wi/2− δ.
Therefore, the price of stability of this game is 2(n− 1)/(n+ 2), which approaches 2 as n increases.
We show that above bound can be improved when edge weights are integer. Indeed, it turns out that, in this
special case, the profile that minimizes the social cost is always a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2.7. For an opinion game with integer weights, the price of stability is 1.
Proof. Let G be an n-player opinion game and let x be the profile that minimizes the social cost of G. Assume
for a contradiction that x is not a Nash equilibrium. This means there is a player i for which the condition of
Lemma 2.4 does not hold, i.e., either xi = 1−Bi andWBii (x) > Wi/2−δ or xi = Bi andWBii (x) < Wi/2−δ.
Let us consider the first case (the second one can be handled similarly): we will show that the profile (x−i, Bi)
achieves a social cost lower than x and thus a contradiction. We evaluate the difference between cj(x−i, Bi) and
cj(x) for each player j. If j = i, then
ci(x−i, Bi)−ci(x) = Wi−WBii (x)+(Bi−bi)2−WBii (x)− (1−Bi−bi)2 =Wi−2WBii (x)+2|Bi−bi|−1,
where we used (3). Consider now a neighbor j of i such that xj = Bi. Then,
cj(x−i, Bi)− cj(x) = Wj −WBij (x) − wij + (Bi − bj)2 −Wj +WBij (x)− (Bi − bj)2 = −wij .
For a neighbor j of i such that xj = 1−Bi, we obtain
cj(x−i, Bi)− cj(x) = WBij (x) + wij + (1 −Bi − bj)2 −WBij (x)− (1 −Bi − bj)2 = wij .
Finally, note that players that are not in the neighborhood of i have the same cost in both profiles. Thus, the
difference between social costs is:
SC(x−i, Bi)− SC(x) =Wi − 2WBii (x) + 2|Bi − bi| − 1−
∑
j : (i,j)∈E
xj=Bi
wij +
∑
j : (i,j)∈E
xj=1−Bi
wij
= 2
(
Wi − 2WBii (x) + |Bi − bi|
)
− 1.
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Observe that by definition of Bi, |Bi − bi| ≤ 1/2. We now distinguish two cases.
If |Bi − bi| < 1/2 then WBii (x) > Wi/2 − δ implies WBii (x) ≥ Wi/2 for integer weights. Therefore,
SC(x−i, Bi)− SC(x) = 2
(
Wi − 2WBii (x) + |Bi − bi|
)
− 1 ≤ 2|Bi − bi| − 1 < 0 and this concludes the proof
in this case.
If |Bi−bi| = 1/2 thenWBii (x) > Wi/2−δ is equivalent to WBii (x) > Wi/2 and similarly to the case above
we can conclude SC(x−i, Bi)− SC(x) < 0.
3 Best-response dynamics
To prove the convergence rate of best-response dynamics, we use the following definition, previously used in [14].
Definition 3.1. Two games G,G′ are pure best-response equivalent2 if they have the same sets of players and
pure-strategies, and for any player and pure-strategy profile, that player’s best response is the same in G as in G′.
We prove bounds on the time the best-response dynamics for a game G takes to converge by analyzing the
dynamics on a game G′ that is pure best-response equivalent to G but such that beliefs are “nicely” distributed. We
say that a belief b ∈ [0, 1] is threshold for player i in opinion game G if player i with belief b in G is indifferent
between playing strategy 0 and strategy 1 for some strategies of the players other than i.
Lemma 3.2. Given an opinion game G and a player i in G, we define a finite set Bi of numbers in [0, 1] as follows.
Let B′i contain 0 and 1 together with every threshold belief of player i. Let Bi contains every element of B′i, and
in addition, for every pair of consecutive elements b′1, b′2 of B′i, let Bi contain at least one element in the interval
(b′1, b
′
2) (for example, 12 (b′1 + b′2)).
Then, any opinion game G is pure best-response equivalent to an opinion game G′ in which the beliefs of every
player i in G have been replaced by an element of Bi.
Proof. Fix an opinion game G and player i. Let G′ be an opinion game defined on the same social network as G.
For each player i in G, if his belief bi is threshold, then it belongs to Bi, and we keep it the same in G′. If bi is not
a threshold belief, then in G′ it is replaced by one of the elements of Bi that lies in the subinterval bounded by 2
consecutive elements of B′i containing bi.
We claim that G′ constructed this way, is pure best-response equivalent to G. Consider a player i, and note that
for a pair of beliefs bi and b′i to result in different best responses, there must be a strategy profile for the remaining
players for which the best response under belief bi is opposite to the one under belief b′i. Note however that a
player’s beliefs have been changed in a way that ensures that there is no such pair of pure-strategy profiles.
3.1 A special case: unitary weights
We start by considering the special case in which wij = 1 for each edge (i, j). This helps to develop the ideas that
we use to prove a bound for more general weights.
For a player i, consider B′i as defined in Lemma 3.2. In this special case, it is easy to see that B′i = {0, 1} if the
neighborhood of i has odd size and B′i = {0, 12 , 1}, otherwise. Thus, by Lemma 3.2, in both cases, G is pure best-
response equivalent to an opinion game G′ where each player i has belief in Bi =
{
0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , 1
}
. The following
theorem shows that the best-response dynamics quickly converges to a Nash equilibrium in G′ and hence in G.
Theorem 3.3. The best-response dynamics for an n-player opinion game converges to a Nash equilibrium after
a number of steps that is polynomial in n.
Proof. Let G be an n-player opinion game and let G′ be a pure best-response equivalent game having beliefs in
the set Bi =
{
0, 14 ,
1
2 ,
3
4 , 1
}
. We show that best-response dynamics converges quickly on G′.
We begin by observing that for every profile x, we have 0 ≤ Φ(x) ≤W +n, whereW =∑(i,j)∈E wij ≤ n2.
Thus, the theorem follows by showing that at each time step the cost of a player decreases by at least a constant
value. Fix x−i, the opinions of players other than i, and let xi be the strategy currently played by player i and s
be his best response. By definition of best response, we have ci(x) > ci(s,x−i). We will show that
1
2
≤ Φ(x)− Φ(s,x−i) = ci(xi,x−i)− ci(s,x−i) = (xi − bi)2 − (s− bi)2 +Di(x)−Di(s,x−i)
= 2|xi − bi| − 1 + ∆D,
(4)
2In [14] they just use “equivalent”.
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where the last equality follows by (3) (with xi in place of Bi) and by using ∆D as a shorthand for Di(x) −
Di(s,x−i). We distinguish three cases based on the value of ∆D.
If ∆D > 1, then it will be the case that ∆D ≥ 2. Since the difference between the squares is bounded from below
by −1, then (4) follows.
If −1 < ∆D ≤ 1, then it will be the case that ∆D ∈ {0, 1}. If xi = 0, then ci(xi,x−i) > ci(s,x−i) implies
bi >
1−∆D
2 and, from bi ∈ Bi, bi ≥ 1−∆D+1/22 ; for these values of bi and xi (4) follows. Similarly, if xi = 1,
then ci(xi,x−i) > ci(s,x−i) implies bi < 1+∆D2 and, from bi ∈ Bi, bi ≤ 1+∆D−1/22 ; for these values of bi and
xi (4) follows.
If ∆D ≤ −1, then we will reach a contradiction. Indeed, since the difference between the squares is bounded
from above by 1, we have ci(xi,x−i) ≤ ci(s,x−i).
3.2 Finite-precision weights
We now show how to extend the bound for the convergence of the best-response dynamics to opinion games whose
edge weights have bounded precision k, i.e. they can be written with at most k digit after the decimal point.
Given an opinion game G, we consider a game G′ that is exactly the same as G except that in G′ the utility of
player i in the profile x is
u′i(x) = 10
k · ui(x).
We say G′ is the integer version of G. Obviously, G is pure best-response equivalent to G′ and G′ is a potential
game with potential function Φ′ = 10k · Φ. Note that G′ can be equivalently described as follows: each player
has two strategies, 0 and 1, and a personal belief bi as in G; for each edge e of the social graph of G, we set
w′e = 10
k · we and D′i(x) =
∑
j : xi 6=xj w
′
ij . Then
u′i(x) = −
(
10k(xi − bi)2 +D′i(x)
)
.
Note that w′e is an integer for each edge e. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Consider an opinion game G and for each player i consider the set B′i as defined in Lemma 3.2.
Then for each b ∈ B′i, we have that 10k · 2b is an integer.
Proof. If b ∈ {0, 1}, then the lemma trivially follows. As for b being a threshold belief, we distinguish two cases:
if b ≤ 1/2, then, by Lemma 2.4, there is a profile x such that
bi =
1
2
− 1
2
∑
j
wij +
∑
j : xj=0
wij .
Hence,
10k · 2bi = 10k −
∑
j
w′ij + 2
∑
j : xj=0
w′ij .
Since each term in the right-hand side of the last equation is an integer then so is also 10k · 2bi. The case b > 1/2
can be handled similarly.
Now we are ready for proving a bound on the convergence time of the best-response dynamics.
Theorem 3.5. The best-response dynamics for an n-player opinion game G whose edge weights have bounded
precision k converges to a Nash equilibrium in O(10k · n2 · wmax), where wmax is the largest edge weight in G.
Proof. Fix the opinion game G and for each player i consider the set B′i as defined in Lemma 3.2. Consider,
moreover,Bi containing every element of B′i, and in addition, the element 12 (b′1+ b′2) for every pair of consecutive
elements b′1, b′2 of B′i.
Let G′ be an opinion game such that each player i has belief in Bi. From Lemma 3.2, G and G′ are pure
best-response equivalent games. Moreover consider G′′ the integer version of G′, which is pure best-response
equivalent to G′ and then to G. Below all the notation defined so far uses a double prime when it refers to G′′. We
show that best-response dynamics converges in O(10k · n2 · wmax) steps on G′′.
We begin by observing that for every profile x, we have 0 ≤ Φ′′(x) ≤ 10k
(∑
(i,j)∈E wij + n
)
= O(10k ·
n2 ·wmax). Thus, the theorem follows by showing that at each time step the cost of a player decreases by at least a
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constant value. Fix x−i, the opinions of players other than i, and let xi be the strategy currently played by player
i and s be his best response. By setting c′′i (x) = −u′′i (x), from the definition of best response, it follows that
c′′i (x) > c
′′
i (s,x−i). We will show that
1/2 ≤ Φ′′(x) − Φ′′(s,x−i) = c′′i (xi,x−i)− c′′i (s,x−i)
= 10k
(
(xi − bi)2 − (s− bi)2
)
+D′′i (x) −D′′i (s,x−i) = 10k (2|xi − bi| − 1) + ∆D,
(5)
where the last equality follows by (3) (with xi in place of Bi) and by using ∆D as a shorthand for D′′i (x) −
D′′i (s,x−i). We distinguish three cases based on the value of ∆D.
If ∆D > 10k, then, since all edge weights are integers, it will be the case that ∆D ≥ 10k+1. Since the difference
between the squares is bounded from below by −1, then (5) follows.
If −10k < ∆D ≤ 10k, then, since all edge weights are integers, we have ∆D ∈ {−10k+1, . . . , 10k}. If xi = 0,
then c′′i (xi,x−i) > c′′i (s,x−i) implies bi > 10
k−∆D
2·10k . Since 10
k · 2b is an integer for each threshold belief b, the
smallest threshold belief greater than 10
k−∆D
2·10k should be at least
10k−∆D+1
2·10k . Hence, the first element of Bi greater
than 10
k−∆D
2·10k will be at least
1
2
(
10k −∆D
2 · 10k +
10k −∆D + 1
2 · 10k
)
=
10k −∆D + 1/2
2 · 10k .
Thus, if xi = 0, then bi ≥ 10
k−∆D+1/2
2·10k and (5) follows. Similarly, one can prove that if xi = 1, then bi ≤
10k+∆D−1/2
2·10k and (5) follows.
If ∆D ≤ −10k, then we will reach a contradiction. Indeed, since the difference between the squares is bounded
from above by 1, we have ci(xi,x−i) ≤ ci(s,x−i).
The bound on the convergence time of the best response dynamics given in previous theorem can be very large
if the edge weights are very large or very small (in which case, we need high precision). However, in the next
section we will show that, in these cases, such a large bound cannot be avoided.
3.3 Exponentially many best-response steps for general weights
The following result builds a game with an exponentially large gap between the largest and the smallest edge
weight for which there exist exponentially long sequences of best responses, where the choice of the player switch-
ing his strategy at each step is made by an adversary. Thus it remains an open question whether exponentially-
many steps may be required if, for example, players were allowed to best-respond in round robin manner, or if the
best-responding player was chosen randomly at each step. However this does establish that the potential function
on its own is insufficient to upper-bound the number of steps with any polynomial. The construction uses graphs
with bounded degree and pathwidth, with all players having belief 12 .
Theorem 3.6. The best-response dynamics for opinion games may take exponentially-many steps.
Proof. In the following construction, all players have a belief of 12 .
We start by giving some preliminary definitions. A 6-gadget G is a set of 6 players {A,B,C,D,E, F} with
edges (A,B), (B,C) and (C,D) having weights ε, 2ε, 3ε respectively and edges (D,E), (B,F ) and (D,F ), all
weighting 4ε, for some ε > 0.
Consider a 6-gadget and a new player A0 with edges (A0, B) and (A0, D) of weight 4ε. We say that A0
is a switch for the 6-gadget G, since it allows G to switch between the opinion vectors (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) and
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1). Specifically, if initially the players (A,B,C,D,E, F ) have opinions (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1) and A0
is set to 1, then we can have the following best-response sequence in the 6-gadget, that will be named switch-on
cycle:
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)→ (0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)→ (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1).
If instead the players (A,B,C,D,E, F ) have opinions (0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1) and A0 is set to 0, then we can have the
following best-response sequence in the 6-gadget, that will be named switch-off cycle:
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ (1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ (0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)→ (0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)
→ (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1)→ (1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1)→ (1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1)→ (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)→ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
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Notice that A’s opinion does not change in the switch-on cycle, whereas it follows the sequence 0 → 1 → 0 →
1→ 0 during the switch-off cycle.
We now define the game. Consider n 6-gadgets Gi with players {Ai, Bi, Ci, Di, Ei, Fi} and edge weights
parametrized by εi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For each i = 2, . . . , n, we connect Gi with Gi−1 by having Ai−1 acting as
a switch for Gi. We finally add the switch player A0 for G1. Thus, the total number of players is 6n+ 1.
In order that the behavior of Ai in gadget Gi, for i = 1, . . . , n − 1 is not influenced by the new edges,
(Ai, Bi+1) and (Ai, Di+1) of weight 4εi+1, we need that the weights of these edges are small enough with respect
to the weight of the unique edge incident on Ai in the gadget Gi, namely (Ai, Bi) of weight εi. Specifically, it
is sufficient to set εi > 8εi+1. Hence, the largest edge-weight is 4ε1 and the smallest edge-weight is εn and their
ratio is greater than 4 · 8n−1 = 23n−1.
Consider now the following starting profile: players B1 and D1 have opinion 1, all players Fi have opinion 1,
and all other players start with opinion 0. Note that G1 is in the starting configuration of a switch-off cycle.
We finally specify an exponentially-long sequence of best-response: we start the switch-off cycle of G1; as
long as Ai, for i = 1, . . . , n−1, switches his opinion from 0 to 1, we execute the switch-on cycle of Gi+1; as long
as Ai, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1, switches his opinion from 1 to 0, we execute the switch-off cycle of Gi+1. Note that
the last two cases occur two times during the switch-off cycle of Gi. Thus, G2 goes through 2 switch-on cycles
and 2 switch-off cycles, G3 goes through 4 switch-on cycles and 4 switch-off cycles and, hence, Gn goes through
2n−1 switch-on cycles and 2n−1 switch-off cycles.
4 Logit Dynamics for Opinion Games
Let G be an opinion game as from the above; moreover, let S = {0, 1}n denote the set of all strategy profiles.
For two vectors x,y ∈ S, we denote with H(x,y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}| the Hamming distance between x and
y. The Hamming graph of the game G is defined as H = (S,E), where two profiles x = (x1, . . . , xn),y =
(y1, . . . , yn) ∈ S are adjacent in H if and only if H(x,y) = 1.
The logit dynamics for G runs as follows: at every time step (i) Select one player i ∈ [n] uniformly at
random; (ii) Update the strategy of player i according to the Boltzmann distribution with parameter β over the set
Si = {0, 1} of his strategies. That is, a strategy si ∈ Si will be selected with probability
σi(si | x−i) = 1
Zi(x−i)
eβui(x−i,si), (6)
where x−i ∈ {0, 1}n−1 is the profile of strategies played at the current time step by players different from i,
Zi(x−i) =
∑
zi∈Si e
βui(x−i,zi) is the normalizing factor, and β ≥ 0. As mentioned above, from (6), it is easy to
see that for β = 0 player i selects his strategy uniformly at random, for β > 0 the probability is biased toward
strategies promising higher payoffs, and for β that goes to ∞ player i chooses his best response strategy (if more
than one best response is available, he chooses one of them uniformly at random).
The above dynamics defines a Markov chain {Xt}t∈N with the set of strategy profiles as state space, and
where the probability P (x,y) of a transition from profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) to profile y = (y1, . . . , yn) is zero if
H(x,y) ≥ 2 and it is 1nσi(yi | x−i) if the two profiles differ exactly at player i. More formally, we can define the
logit dynamics as follows.
Definition 4.1 (Logit dynamics [10]). Let G be an opinion game as from the above and let β ≥ 0. The logit
dynamics for G is the Markov chain Mβ = ({Xt}t∈N, S, P ) where S = {0, 1}n and
P (x,y) =
1
n
·


σi(yi | x−i), if y−i = x−i and yi 6= xi;∑n
i=1 σi(yi | x−i), if y = x;
0, otherwise;
(7)
where σi(yi | x−i) is defined in (6).
The Markov chain defined by (7) is ergodic. Hence, from every initial profile x the distribution P t(x, ·) of
chain Xt starting at x will eventually converge to a stationary distribution π as t tends to infinity.3 As in [5],
we call the stationary distribution π of the Markov chain defined by the logit dynamics on a game G, the logit
3The notation P t(x, ·), standard in Markov chains literature [22], denotes the probability distribution over states of S after the chain has
taken t steps starting from x.
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equilibrium of G. In general, a Markov chain with transition matrix P and state space S is said to be reversible
with respect to the distribution π if, for all x,y ∈ S, it holds that π(x)P (x,y) = π(y)P (y,x). If the chain
is reversible with respect to π, then π is its stationary distribution. Therefore when this happens, to simplify our
exposition we simply say that the matrix P is reversible. For the class of potential games the stationary distribution
is the well known Gibbs measure.
Theorem 4.2 ([10]). If G = ([n],S,U) is a potential game with potential function Φ, then the Markov chain
given by (7) is reversible with respect to the Gibbs measure π(x) = 1Z e−βΦ(x), where Z =
∑
y∈S e
−βΦ(y) is the
normalizing constant.
Mixing time of Markov chains. One of the prominent measures of the rate of convergence of a Markov chain
to its stationary distribution is the mixing time. For a Markov chain with transition matrix P and state space S, let
us set
d(t) = max
x∈S
∥∥P t(x, ·) − π∥∥
TV
,
where the total variation distance ‖µ− ν‖TV between two probability distributions µ and ν on the same state
space S is defined as
‖µ− ν‖TV = maxA⊂S |µ(A)− ν(A)| =
1
2
∑
x∈S
|µ(x)− ν(x)| =
∑
x∈S :
µ(x)>ν(x)
(µ(x)− ν(x)) .
For 0 < ε < 1/2, the mixing time is defined as
tmix(ε) = min{t ∈ N : d(t) ≤ ε}.
It is usual to set ε = 1/4 or ε = 1/2e. If not explicitly specified, when we write tmix we mean tmix(1/4). Observe
that tmix(ε) ≤ ⌈log2 ε−1⌉tmix.
Next we bound the mixing time of the logit dynamics for an opinion game. Note that, bounds on the mixing
time of the logit dynamics for general potential games has been given in [4]. However, these bounds are not tight
for the class of opinion game. Moreover, they do not highlight the existing connection between the convergence
time of the logit dynamics and the topology of the social network underlying the opinion game.
4.1 Techniques
To derive our bounds, we employ several different techniques: Markov chain coupling and spectral techniques for
the upper bound and bottleneck ratio for the lower bound. They are well-established techniques for bounding the
mixing time; we next summarize them.
4.1.1 Markov chain coupling
A coupling of two probability distributions µ and ν on S is a pair of random variables (X,Y ) defined on S × S
such that the marginal distribution ofX is µ and the marginal distribution of Y is ν. A coupling of a Markov chain
M on S with transition matrix P is a process (Xt, Yt)∞t=0 with the property thatXt and Yt are both Markov chains
with transition matrix P and state space S. When the two coupled chains (Xt, Yt)∞t=0 start at (X0, Y0) = (x,y),
we write Px,y (·) and Ex,y [·] for the probability and the expectation on the space S× S. We denote by τcouple the
first time the two chains meet; that is,
τcouple = min{t : Xt = Yt}.
We also consider only couplings of Markov chains with the property that Xs = Ys for s ≥ τcouple.
Recall that H = (S,E) is the Hamming graph; for x,y ∈ S, we denote by ρ(x,y) the length of the shortest
path in H between x and y. The following theorem says that it is sufficient to define a coupling only for pairs of
Markov chains starting from states adjacent in H and an upper bound on the mixing time can be obtained if each
of these couplings contracts their distance on average.
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Theorem 4.3 (Path Coupling [11]). Suppose that for every edge (x,y) ∈ E a coupling (Xt, Yt) of M with
X0 = x and Y0 = y exists such that Ex,y [ρ(X1, Y1)] ≤ e−α for some α > 0. Then
tmix(ε) ≤ log(diam(H)) + log(1/ε)
α
where diam(H) is the diameter of H.
We here describe only the coupling that we use in the proof of Theorem 4.9 below. Our exposition follows the
one in [5]. For every pair of strategy profiles x = (x1, . . . , xn),y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ {0, 1}n we define a coupling
(X1, Y1) of two copies of the Markov chain for which X0 = x and Y0 = y. The coupling proceeds as follows:
first, pick a player i uniformly at random; then, update the strategies xi and yi of player i in the two chains, by
setting
(xi, yi) =


(0, 0), with probability min{σi(0 | x), σi(0 | y)};
(1, 1), with probability min{σi(1 | x), σi(1 | y)};
(0, 1), with probability σi(0 | x)−min{σi(0 | x), σi(0 | y)};
(1, 0), with probability σi(1 | x)−min{σi(1 | x), σi(1 | y)}.
Observe that for every player i, at most one of the updates (xi, yi) = (0, 1) and (xi, yi) = (1, 0) has positive
probability. Moreover, if σi(0 | x) = σi(0 | y) and player i is chosen, then, after the update, we have xi = yi.
For the path coupling technique (see Theorem 4.3), the coupling described above is applied only to pairs of
starting profiles which are adjacent in H.
4.1.2 Relaxation time and spectral techniques
Another important measure related to the convergence of Markov chains is given by the relaxation time. Let P
be the transition matrix of a Markov chain with finite state space S and let us label the eigenvalues of P in non-
increasing order λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ|S|. It is well-known (see, for example, Lemma 12.1 in [22]) that λ1 = 1
and, if P is irreducible and aperiodic, then λ2 < 1 and λ|S| > −1. We set λ⋆ as the largest eigenvalue in absolute
value other than λ1, that is, λ⋆ = maxi=2,...,|S| {|λi|} . The relaxation time trel of a Markov chain M is defined
as
trel =
1
1− λ⋆ .
The relaxation time is related to the mixing time by the following theorem (see, for example, Theorems 12.3 and
12.4 in [22]).
Theorem 4.4 (Relaxation time). Let P be the transition matrix of a reversible, irreducible, and aperiodic Markov
chain with state space S and stationary distribution π. Then
(trel − 1) log 2 ≤ tmix ≤ log
(
4
πmin
)
trel,
where πmin = minx∈S π(x).
Bounds on relaxation time can be obtained by using the following lemma (see Corollary 13.24 in [22]).
Lemma 4.5. Let P be the transition matrix of an irreducible, aperiodic and reversible Markov chain with state
space S and stationary distribution π. Consider the graph H = (S,E), where E = {(x,y) : P (x,y) > 0}, and
to every pair of states x,y ∈ S we assign a path Γx,y from x to y in G. We define
ρ = max
e=(z,w)∈E
1
Q(e)
∑
x,y :
e∈Γx,y
π(x)π(y)|Γx,y |.
Then 11−λ2 ≤ ρ.
We here mention a corollary of Lemma 4.5 that will be useful for our results.
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Corollary 4.6. Let G be an n-player opinion game with profile space S and let P and π be the transition matrix
and the stationary distribution of the logit dynamics for G, respectively. For every pair of profiles x,y we assign
a path Γx,y on the Hamming graph H. Then
trel ≤ 2n max
z,w :
H(z,w)=1
π(z)≤π(w)
1
π(z)
∑
x,y :
(z,w)∈Γx,y
π(x)π(y)|Γx,y |.
Proof. In [4] it is proved that all the eigenvalues of the transition matrix of the logit dynamics for potential games
are non-negative. It follows then that trel = 11−λ2 . Moreover, by reversibility of P , we have that for z,w ∈ S such
that H(z,w) = 1 and π(z) ≤ π(w) it holds:
Q(z,w) = π(z)P (z,w) ≥ π(z)
2n
.
Thus, the claim follows from Lemma 4.5.
4.1.3 Bottleneck ratio
Finally, an important concept to establish our lower bounds is represented by the bottleneck ratio. Consider
an ergodic Markov chain with finite state space S, transition matrix P , and stationary distribution π. The
probability distribution Q(x,y) = π(x)P (x,y) is of particular interest and is sometimes called the edge sta-
tionary distribution. Note that if the chain is reversible then Q(x,y) = Q(y,x). For any L ⊆ S, we let
Q(L, S \ L) =∑x∈L,y∈S\LQ(x,y). The bottleneck ratio of L ⊆ S, L non-empty, is
B(L) =
Q(L, S \R)
π(L)
.
We use the following theorem to derive lower bounds to the mixing time (see, for example, Theorem 7.3 in [22]).
Theorem 4.7 (Bottleneck ratio). LetM = {Xt : t ∈ N} be an irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain with finite
state space S, transition matrix P , and stationary distribution π. Then the mixing time is
tmix ≥ max
L : π(L)≤1/2
1
4B(L)
.
4.2 Upper bounds
4.2.1 For every β
Consider the bijective function σ : V → {1, . . . , |V |} representing an ordering of vertices of G. Let L be the set
of all orderings of vertices of G and set V σi = {v ∈ V : σ(v) < i}. Moreover, for any partition (L,R) of V
let W (L,R) be the sum of the weights of edges that have an endpoint in L and the other one in R. Then, the
(weighted) cutwidth of G is
CW(G) = min
σ∈L
max
1<i≤|V |
W (V σi , V \ V σi ).
Theorem 4.8. Let G be an n-player opinion game on a graph G = (V,E). The mixing time of the logit dynamics
for G is
tmix ≤ (1 + β) · poly (n,wmax) · eβΘ(CW(G)).
Proof. This proof is a generalization of a similar proof given by Berger et al. [7] and by Auletta et al. [4].
Consider the ordering of vertices of G that obtains the cutwidth. Fix x,y ∈ S and let v1, v2, . . . , vd denote
the indices (according to this ordering) of the vertices at which the profiles x and y differ; we consider the path
Γx,y = (x
0,x1, . . . ,xd) on H, where
xi =
(
y1, . . . , yvi+1−1, xvi+1 , . . . , xn
)
.
(Above, we assume vd+1 = n + 1). Notice that x0 = x, xd = y and |Γx,y| ≤ n. For every edge ξ = (xi,xi+1)
of H, we consider the function Λξ that assigns to every pair of profiles x,y such that ξ ∈ Γx,y, the following new
profile
Λξ(x,y) =
{(
x1, . . . , xvi+1−1, yvi+1 , yvi+1+1, . . . , yn
)
if π(xi) ≤ π(xi+1);(
x1, . . . , xvi+1−1, xvi+1 , yvi+1+1, . . . , yn
)
otherwise,
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where π denotes the stationary distribution (cf. Theorem 4.2). It is easy to see that Λξ is an injective function:
indeed, since ξ is known, if π(xi) ≤ π(xi+1), then we can retrieve vi+1, that is the first vertex where xi and xi+1
differ and thus, selecting the first vi+1 − 1 vertices from Λξ(x,y) and the remaining ones from xi we are able to
reconstruct x and, similarly, selecting the first vi+1 − 1 vertices from xi and the remaining ones from Λξ(x,y)
we are able to reconstruct y. Similarly, if π(xi) > π(xi+1), we can retrieve vi+1 and we can reconstruct x and y
from Λξ(x,y) and xi+1.
Let E⋆ = {(j, k) ∈ E : j < vi+1 and k ≥ vi+1}: observe that
∑
(j,k)∈E⋆ wjk ≤ CW(G). For any edge
e = (j, k) ∈ E⋆, for every x,y ∈ S and for every ξ = (xi,xi+1) ∈ Γx,y, we distinguish two cases:
If xj = yj or xk = yk, for all available values of xj , yj, xk and yk we show
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y)) = 0,
where ⊥xi,xi+1 = argmin{π(xi), π(xi+1)}. Firstly, assume that xj = yj and ⊥xi,xi+1 = xi which in turns
implies that Λξ(x,y) = (x1, . . . , xvi+1−1, yvi+1 , yvi+1+1, . . . , yn). We have:
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y)) = Φe(xj , xk) + Φe(yj , yk)− Φe(yj , xk)− Φe(xj , yk)
= Φe(xj , xk) + Φe(xj , yk)− Φe(xj , xk)− Φe(xj , yk) = 0.
It is not hard to check that the same is true for all the other possible cases arising.
If xj 6= yj and xk 6= yk, similarly to the above, it is not hard to see that for all available values of xj , yj , xk and
yk
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y)) = ±(αe + δe − βe − γe) = ±2we,
where αe, βe, γe and δe are defined in (2). Moreover for e = (j, k) ∈ E \ E⋆ it holds:
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y)) = 0
since, by construction, one of ⊥xi,xi+1 and Λξ(x,y) has j-th and k-th entry of x and the other has j-th and k-th
entry of y. Thus, we have that for every x,y ∈ S and for every ξ = (xi,xi+1) ∈ Γx,y,
Φ(x) + Φ(y)− Φ(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φ(Λξ(x,y)) =
∑
e∈E
(
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y))
)
=
∑
e∈E⋆
(
Φe(x) + Φe(y) − Φe(⊥xi,xi+1)− Φe(Λξ(x,y))
)
≥ −2CW(G).
(8)
Now let ξ⋆ = (z,w) with π(z) ≤ π(w) be the edge of H for which ∑ x,y :
ξ⋆∈Γx,y
π(x)π(y)
π(z) |Γx,y| is maximized.
Applying Corollary 4.6, we obtain
trel ≤ 2n
∑
x,y :
ξ⋆∈Γx,y
π(x)π(y)
π(z)
|Γx,y| ≤ 2n2
∑
x,y :
ξ⋆∈Γx,y
π(x)π(y)
π(z)π(Λξ⋆(x,y))
π(Λξ⋆(x,y))
≤ 2n2e2βCW(G)
∑
x,y :
ξ⋆∈Γx,y
π(Λξ⋆(x,y)) ≤ 2n2e2βCW(G)
∑
x
π(x) ≤ 2n2e2βCW(G),
where the third inequality follows from Theorem 4.2 and (8), and the penultimate from the fact that Λξ is injective.
The theorem follows from Theorem 4.4 and by observing that, since Φ(x) ≥ 0 for any strategy profile x,
Theorem 4.2 implies
log
(
(πmin/4)
−1) = log
(
4
∑
x
e−β(Φ(x)−Φmax)
)
≤ log (2n+2 · eβΦmax) ≤ log (en+2+βΦmax) = n+ 2 + βΦmax,
(9)
where Φmax = maxx Φ(x) ≤ n+W.
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4.2.2 For small β
The following theorem shows that for small values of β the mixing time is polynomial. We remark that there
are network topologies for which this theorem gives a bound higher than that guaranteed by Theorem 4.8 on the
values of β for which the mixing time is polynomial.
Theorem 4.9. Let G be an n-player opinion game on a connected graphG, with n > 2. Let ∆max be the maximum
degree in the graph. If β ≤ 1/(wmax∆max), then the mixing time of the logit dynamics for G is O(n log n).
Proof. Consider two profiles x and y that differ only in the strategy played by player j. W.l.o.g., we assume
xj = 1 and yj = 0. We consider the coupling described in Section 4.1.1 for two chains X and Y starting
respectively from X0 = x and Y0 = y. We next compute the expected distance between X1 and Y1 after one step
of the coupling.
Let Ni be the set of neighbors of i in the opinion game. Notice that for any player i, σi(0 | x) only depends
on xk , for any k ∈ Ni, and σi(0 | y) only on yk, for any k ∈ Ni. Therefore, since x and y only differ at position
j, σi(0 | x) = σi(0 | y) for i /∈ Nj .
We start by observing that if position j is chosen for update (this happens with probability 1/n) then, by the
observation above, both chains perform the same update. Since x and y differ only for player j, we have that the
two chains are coupled (and thus at distance 0). Similarly, if player i 6= j with i /∈ Nj is selected for update (which
happens with probability (n−∆j − 1)/n) we have that both chains perform the same update and thus remain at
distance 1. Finally, let us consider the case in which i ∈ Nj is selected for update. In this case, since xj = 1 and
yj = 0, we have that σi(0 | x) ≤ σi(0 | y). Therefore, with probability σi(0 | x) both chains update position i to
0 and thus remain at distance 1; with probability σi(1 | y) = 1− σi(0 | y) both chains update position i to 1 and
thus remain at distance 1; and with probability σi(0 | y) − σi(0 | x) chain X updates position i to 1 and chain
Y updates position i to 0 and thus the two chains go to distance 2. By summing up, we have that the expected
distance E[ρ(X1, Y1)] after one step of coupling of the two chains is
E[ρ(X1, Y1)] =
n−∆j − 1
n
+
1
n
∑
i∈Nj
[σi(0 | x) + 1− σi(0 | y) + 2 · (σi(0 | y) − σi(0 | x))]
=
n−∆j − 1
n
+
1
n
·
∑
i∈Nj
(1 + σi(0 | y) − σi(0 | x))
=
n− 1
n
+
1
n
·
∑
i∈Nj
(σi(0 | y)− σi(0 | x)).
Let us now evaluate the differenceσi(0 | y)−σi(0 | x) for some i ∈ Nj . Recall thatW si (x) denotes the sum of the
weights of edges connecting iwith neighbors that have opinion s in the profile x. Note thatW 0i (y) = W 0i (x)+wij
and W 1i (x) = W 1i (y) + wij = Wi − W 0i (x). For sake of compactness we will denote with ℓ the quantity
eβ(2bi−1+2W
1
i (x)−Wi)
. By (6) we have
σi(0 | x) = e
−β(b2i+W 1i (x))
e−β(b2i+W 1i (x)) + e−β((1−bi)2+Wi−W 1i (x))
=
1
1 + ℓ
,
and
σi(0 | y) = e
−β(b2i+W 1i (x)−wij)
e−β(b2i+W 1i (x)−wij) + e−β((1−bi)2+Wi−W 1i (x)+wij)
=
1
1 + ℓe−2wi,jβ
.
The function 1
1+ℓe−2wijβ
− 11+ℓ is maximized for ℓ = ewijβ . Thus
σi(0 | y) − σi(0 | x) ≤ 1
1 + e−β
− 1
1 + eβ
=
2
1 + e−β
− 1.
By using the well-known approximation e−wijβ ≥ 1− wijβ and since by hypothesiswijβ ≤ 1/∆max, we have
σi(0 | y) − σi(0 | x) ≤ wijβ · 1
2− wijβ ≤
1
∆max
· ∆max
2∆max − 1 .
We can conclude that the expected distance after one step of the chain is
E[ρ(X1, Y1)] ≤ n− 1
n
+
1
n
· ∆j
2∆max − 1 ≤
n− 1
n
+
2
3n
= 1− 1
3n
≤ e− 13n .
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where the second inequality relies on the fact that ∆max ≥ 2, since the social graph is connected and n > 2. Since
diam(H) = n, by applying Theorem 4.3 with α = 13n , we obtain the theorem.
4.3 Lower bound
Recall that H is the Hamming graph on the set of profiles of an opinion games on a graph G. The following
observation easily follows from the definition of cutwidth.
Observation 4.10. For every path on H between the profile 0 = (0, . . . , 0) and the profile 1 = (1, . . . , 1) there
exists a profile for which the weight of the discording edges is at least CW(G).
From now on, let us write CW as a shorthand for CW(G), when the reference to the graph is clear from the
context. For sake of compactness, we set b(x) =
∑
i(xi − bi)2. We denote as b⋆ the minimum of b(x) over all
profiles with CW discording edges.
Let R0 (R1) be the set of profiles x for which a path from 0 (resp., 1) to x exists in H such that every profile
along the path has potential value less than b⋆ + CW. To establish the lower bound we use the technical result
given by Theorem 4.7 which requires to compute the bottleneck ratio of a subset of profiles that is weighted at most
a half by the stationary distribution. Accordingly, we set R = R0 if π(R0) ≤ 1/2 and R = R1 if π(R1) ≤ 1/2.
(If both sets have stationary distribution less than one half, the best lower bound is achieved by setting R to R0 if
and only if Φ(0) ≤ Φ(1) since, in this case, b(0) ≤ b(1).) W.l.o.g., in the remaining of this section we assume
R = R0.
4.3.1 For large β
Let ∂R be the set of profiles in R that have at least a neighbor y in the Hamming graph H such that y /∈ R.
Moreover let E(∂R) the set of edges (x,y) in H such that x ∈ ∂R and y /∈ R: note that |E(∂R)| ≤ n|∂R|. The
following lemma bounds the bottleneck ratio of R.
Lemma 4.11. For the set of profiles R defined above, we have B(R) ≤ n · |∂R| · e−β(CW+b⋆−b(0)).
Proof. Since 0 ∈ R, it holds π(R) ≥ π(0) = e−βb(0)Z . Moreover, by (6) we have
Q(R,R) =
∑
(x,y)∈E(∂R):
y=(x
−i,yi)
e−βΦ(x)
Z
eβui(y)
eβui(x) + eβui(y)
=
∑
(x,y)∈E(∂R):
y=(x
−i,yi)
e−βΦ(x)
Z
e−βΦ(y)eβ(ui(x)+Φ(x))
e−βΦ(x)eβ(ui(x)+Φ(x)) + e−βΦ(y)eβ(ui(x)+Φ(x))
=
1
Z
∑
(x,y)∈E(∂R)
e−βΦ(x)e−βΦ(y)
e−βΦ(x) + e−βΦ(y)
=
1
Z
∑
(x,y)∈E(∂R)
e−βΦ(y)
1 + eβ(Φ(x)−Φ(y))
≤ 1
Z
∑
(x,y)∈E(∂R)
e−βΦ(y) ≤ |E(∂R)| · e
−β(b⋆+CW)
Z
.
The second equality follows from the definition of potential function which implies Φ(y) − Φ(x) = −ui(y) +
ui(x) for x and y as above; last inequality holds because if by contradiction Φ(y) < b⋆+CW then, by definition
of R, it would be y ∈ R, a contradiction.
From Lemma 4.11 and Theorem 4.7 we obtain a lower bound to the mixing time of the opinion games that
holds for every value of β, every social network G and every vector (b1, . . . , bn) of internal beliefs. However, it
is not clear how close this bound is to the one given in Theorem 4.8. Nevertheless, by taking bi = 1/2 for each
player i and β high enough, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12. Let G be an n-player opinion game on a graph G. Then, there exists a vector of internal beliefs
such that for β = Ω
(
n logn
CW
)
it holds tmix ≥ eβΘ(CW).
Proof. If bi = 1/2 for every player i, from Lemma 4.11 and Theorem 4.7, since |∂R| ≤ 2n then
tmix ≥ e
βCW
n2n
= eβCW−n log(2n) = eβΘ(CW).
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4.3.2 For smaller β
Theorem 4.12 gives an (essentially) tight lower bound for high values of β for each network topology. It would be
interesting to prove a matching bound also for lower values of the rationality parameter: in this section we prove
such a bound for specific classes of graphs: complete bipartite graphs and cliques.
We start by considering the class of complete bipartite graphs Km,m.
Theorem 4.13. Let G be an n-player opinion game on Km,m. Then, there exist a vector of internal beliefs and
edge weights such that, for every β = Ω ( 1m), we have tmix ≥ eβΘ(CW)n .
To prove the theorem above, we start by evaluating the cutwidth of Km,m: we focus on instances of the game
with identical edge weights. To simplify the exposition, we assume that we = 1 for all the edges e of Km,m and
characterize the best ordering from which the cutwidth is obtained. We will denote with A and B the two sides of
the bipartite graph.
Claim 4.14. For identical edge weights, the ordering that obtains the cutwidth in Km,m is the one that selects
alternatively a vertex from A and a vertex from B. Moreover, the cutwidth of Km,m is ⌈m2/2⌉.
Proof. Let (T, V \ T ) be a cut of the graph, we denote with t the size of T : we also denote tA as the number of
vertices of A in T and tB as the number of vertices of B in T . Obviously, t = tA + tB . Given tA and tB , the
size of the cut (T, V \ T ) will be tA(m− tB) + tB(m− tA) = mt− 2tA(t− tA). It is immediate to check that
for every fixed t the cut is minimized when ⌈t/2⌉ vertices of T are taken from A and the remaining ones from B.
Therefore, the cutwidth is achieved by an ordering which selects alternatively vertices from the two sides of the
graph and is then given by the maximum over t of⌈
t
2
⌉(
m−
⌊
t
2
⌋)
+
⌊
t
2
⌋(
m−
⌈
t
2
⌉)
.
The above function is equal to mt− t2−12 for t odd and m − t2/2 for t even. Both these fuctions are maximized
for t = m. However, this may be impossible to achieve when for example t is odd and m is even. Nevertheless, a
simple case analysis on the parity of m and t shows that the maximum is achieved for t = m− 1,m,m+1 when
m is even and for t = m for m odd, resulting in a cutwidth of ⌈m2/2⌉.
The following lemma gives a bound to the size of ∂R for this graph.
Lemma 4.15. For the opinion game on the graph Km,m with bi = 1/2 for every player i and identical edge
weights, there exists a constant c1 such that |∂R| ≤ ec1
√
CW
.
Proof. Since bi = 1/2 for every player i, we have that b(x) = n/4 for every profile x. Therefore, by definition
of R, all profiles in R (and therefore ∂R) have less then CW discording edges. Indeed, for x ∈ R we have
b(x) + |D(x)| = Φ(x) < b⋆ + CW. Moreover, if a profile y has less then CW −m discording edges, then y is
not in ∂R as a state neighbor of y has at most m− 1 additional discording edges.
Consequently, to bound the size of ∂R, we need to count the number of profiles in R that have potential
between b⋆ +CW−m and b⋆ +CW− 1 (i.e., the number of profiles with at least CW−m and at most CW− 1
discording edges). To count that, we consider two sets L0 and L1: we start by setting L0 = V and L1 = ∅. We
take vertices from L0 and sequentially move them to L1. We can think of L0 as the set of vertices with opinion
0 and L1 as the set of vertices with opinion 1: this way we can model a path from 0 to 1 in the Hamming graph.
The numberM(t) of edges between L0 and L1 after t moves is the number of discording edges in the social graph
when vertices in L0 have opinion 0 and vertices in L1 have opinion 1. We have⌈
t
2
⌉(
m−
⌊
t
2
⌋)
+
⌊
t
2
⌋(
m−
⌈
t
2
⌉)
≤M(t) ≤ mt,
where the lower bound follows from the structural proof of minimum cuts contained in Claim 4.14.
Let t1 be the largest integer such that for all possible ways to choose t1 − 1 vertices in L0 and move them in
L1, the number of edges between L0 and L1 is less than CW −m, i.e.
(t1 − 1)m < CW −m⇒ t1 =
⌊
CW
m
⌋
=
⌊
m
2
⌋
=
⌊
n
4
⌋
.
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Let t2 be the smallest integer such that for all possible ways to move t2 +1 vertices from L0 to L1, the number of
edges between L0 and L1 is at least CW, i.e.⌈
t2 + 1
2
⌉(
m−
⌊
t2 + 1
2
⌋)
+
⌊
t2 + 1
2
⌋(
m−
⌈
t2 + 1
2
⌉)
≥ CW,
that, as showed in Claim 4.14, means t2 = m− 2 for m even and t2 = m− 1 for m odd. Then, we can conclude
t2 ≤ m− 1.
By the definition of t1, all profiles with at most t1 − 1 players with opinion 1 are not in ∂R and, by definition
of t2, all profiles with at least t2 + 1 players with opinion 1 are not in R. Thus, we have
|∂R| ≤
t2∑
i=t1
(
n
i
)
≤
t2∑
i=t1
(n · e
i
)i
≤
t2∑
i=t1
(5e)
i
=
(5e)t2+1 − (5e)t1
5e− 1 ≤ (5e)
t2+1 ≤ (5e)m ≤ e3m, (10)
where in the third inequality we used the fact that i ≥ t1 > n/5, in the penultimate the fact that t2 < m and lastly
the fact that 5m ≤ e2m for m ≥ 0. The lemma follows since m ≤ √2√CW.
Proof of Theorem 4.13. If bi = 1/2 for every player i, from Lemmata 4.11 and 4.15, we have
B(R) ≤ n · ec1
√
CW · e−βCW ≤ n · e−βCW(1−c2),
where c2 = c1
√
CW
βCW < 1 since by hypothesis β >
c1√
CW
= Ω(1/m); we also notice that c2 goes to 0 as β increases.
The theorem follows from Theorem 4.7.
We remark that it is possible to prove a result similar to Theorem 4.13 also for the cliqueKn: the proof follows
from a simple generalization of Theorem 15.3 in [22] and by observing that the cutwidth of a clique is ⌊n2/4⌋.
5 Conclusions and open problems
In this work we analyze two decentralized dynamics for binary opinion games: the best-response dynamics and
the logit dynamics. As for the best-response dynamics we show that it takes time polynomial in the number of
players to reach a Nash equilibrium, the latter being characterized by the existence of clusters in which players
have a common opinion. On the other hand, for the logit dynamics we show polynomial convergence when the
level of noise is high enough and that it increases as β grows.
It is important to highlight, as noted above, that the convergence time of the two dynamics are computed with
respect to two different equilibrium concepts, namely Nash equilibrium for the best-response dynamics and logit
equilibrium for the logit dynamics. This explains why the convergence times of these two dynamics asymptotically
diverge even though the logit dynamics becomes similar to the best response dynamics as β goes to infinity.
Theorem 4.8 and 4.12 which prove bounds to the convergence of logit dynamics can also be read in a positive
fashion. Indeed, for social networks that have a bounded cutwidth, the convergence rate of the dynamics depends
only on the value of β. (We highlight that checking if a graph has bounded cutwidth can be done in polynomial
time [27].) In general, we have the following picture: as long as β is less than the maximum of (roughly) log n
CW
and 1
wmax∆max
the convergence time to the logit equilibrium is polynomial. Moreover, Theorem 4.12 shows that
for β lower bounded by (roughly) n logn
CW
the convergence time to the logit equilibrium is super-polynomial. Then
for some network topology, there is a gap in our knowledge which is naturally interesting to close.
In [3] the concept of metastable distributions has been introduced in order to predict the outcome of games for
which the logit dynamics takes too much time to reach the stationary distribution for some value of β. It would be
interesting to investigate existence and structure of such distributions for our opinion games.
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